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MADE IN AMERICA: WHY THE SHALE 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA IS NOT REPLICABLE 
IN CHINA AND ARGENTINA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “shale boom,”1 as many inside and outside the industry call it, has 
been sweeping the United States since 2011, specifically in Texas, Ohio, 
West Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
2
 Technology such as hydraulic 
fracturing, known as “fracking,”3 has given energy producers a new reason 
to tap into the rock formation known as shale and extract its oil and gas.
4
 
Although many outside of the energy industry have heard an increasing 
amount of discussion about shale and fracking in the United States, few 
within that group—and arguably a small number of people involved in the 
industry itself—have heard much discussion concerning shale 
development in other countries. Big economic powers, such as China, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Australia, have recently begun drilling shale 
reserves domestically like the United States.
5
 Unfortunately, the 
similarities between the United States and these other countries mentioned 
both begin and end with drilling domestically, despite the United States’ 
 
 
 1. The U.S. Energy Information Administration stated in its June 2013 report on shale that 
“shale gas resources have revolutionized U.S. oil and natural gas production, providing 29 percent of 
total U.S. crude oil production and 40 percent of total U.S. natural gas production in 2012.” U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11611. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations 
in 41 Countries Outside the United States, June 10, 2013, available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/ 
studies/worldshalegas/pdf/fullreport.pdf for more information on projected numbers. See also Robert 
Bryce, America Needs the Shale Revolution, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB1000142405270230443230457636 9140191493# (arguing that the 
shale revolution has set up the United States for an “industrial renaissance.”); See also Bryce, infra 
note 2.  
 2. Robert Bryce, Shale and Its Discontents, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 15, 2011), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/271890/shale-and-its-discontents-robert-bryce; See also U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, Shale Gas Map (May 9, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/ 
shale_gas.pdf. 
 3. There is some dispute over whether the spelling should be “fracking” or “fracing.” Thomas 
Kurth, American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, 58 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 4.01, .04.05, at 
6 (2012); See also GRAVES, infra note 17. 
 4. See GRAVES, infra note 17. 
 5. According to the EIA, the world has about 32 countries with technically recoverable shale. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment of 14 
Regions Outside the United States (Apr. 2011), http://www.adv-res.com/pdf/ARI%20EIA%20Intl%20 
Gas%20Shale%20APR%202011.pdf. 
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efforts to serve as a model in drilling shale.
6
 The economic prosperity the 
United States has experienced as a result of the shale revolution has yet to 
occur in the aforementioned countries, especially China and Argentina.  
In this Note, I argue that the economic prosperity and apparent success 
the United States has experienced (“the boom”) in drilling shale will not 
be replicated in China, where the shale reserves are estimated to be 
significantly larger than in the United States.
7
 Many have claimed the 
shale boom in the United States is unique, but none have articulated 
specifically why China will not be able to generate the immediate and 
continuous prosperity the United States has had.
8
 Legal factors distinctive 
to the United States, such as private ownership of mineral rights; well-
established environmental and regulatory mechanisms; contract law 
principles; and a free market system demonstrate that China—which has 
recently commenced exploration and production of shale domestically—
will not be able to replicate the economic boom the United States has seen 
 
 
 6. Susan L. Sakmar, The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States Be the Role Model 
for the Development of Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 369, 373 (2011).  
 The United States launched the GSGI in April 2010 as part of an effort to ‘promote global energy 
security and climate security around the world.’ Recognizing that shale gas has been a ‘terrific boon’ 
that many countries would want to replicate, the GSGI seeks to share information about the ‘umbrella 
of laws and regulations’ that exist in the United States. Id. 
 Polish Delegation Attends First Multilateral Meeting of the Global Shale Gas Initiative, EMBASSY 
OF POLAND, Aug. 24 2010, available at http://poland.usembassy.gov/shalegas.html. Although the 
Global Shale Gas Initiative sounds good in theory, only three countries have signed on so far—China, 
India and Poland. David L. Goldwyn, Global Shale Gas Initiative: Balancing Energy Security and 
Environmental Concerns, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPNOTE (Sept. 3, 2010), https://blogs. 
state.gov/stories/2010/09/03/global-shale-gas-initiative-balancing-energy-security-and-environmental-
concerns. Additionally, countries that have signed the initiative have not practically applied the 
regulations and there do not appear to be changes made in order to apply the regulations. David L. 
Goldwyn, Briefing on the Global Shale Gas Initiative Conference at U.S. Department of State (August 
24, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ciea/rmk/146249.htm (noting there are follow-up steps 
which need to be taken in the respective countries who have signed on). 
 7. Olivia Chung, China Joins Shale Gas Hunt, ASIA TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.atimes. 
com/atimes/China_Business/MH24Cb02.html. 
 8. See generally Leonardo Maugeri, The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon,Discussion 
(Belfer Ctr. for Sci. and Int’s Affairs & Harvard Kennedy School, Paper 2013–05, 2013); But see Is 
the U.S. Shale Revolution Replicable?, HOU. BUS. J., Aug. 21, 2013, available at http://www.biz 
journals.com/houston/blog/2013/08/is-the-us-shale-revolution.html?page=all (Although it will take 
time, science and economics will win out in the end and will overcome the most significant barriers to 
shale development—the political ones. Advances in technology will also find a way to overcome many 
of the technical, geologic and cost obstacles currently hindering development).  
 Maugeri ultimately concludes that shale development will eventually occur, little by little, all over 
the world. Id. However, my argument differs. Mainly, the development of shale in other countries will 
undoubtedly occur, but it will come at a high cost and only after a realization that their governments 
need to reform the legal and political structures in their countries. Also, the development will not 
amount to the economic prosperity, or “boom” the United States has seen in terms of jobs, 
infrastructure, and regulatory safeguards. 
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with shale development in the past two years. There is a glimmer of hope, 
however, for the country of Argentina,
9
 which has a hybrid of regulatory, 
contract, and property laws between those of China and the United States, 
possibly opening the door for a successful shale revolution in the future.
10
  
Part II will offer a brief technical overview of shale drilling and the 
historical background of the development of oil and gas laws in the United 
States, China, and Argentina. This section will set out the general laws on 
the books and the regulatory framework the three countries have 
concerning oil and gas, which will likely be the same laws and regulations 
that apply to shale exploration and production. 
Part III will divulge the legal and policy implications of having a free-
market system versus a state-run economic system in the context of ease 
of production, innovation and technology, and corporate attraction. I will 
also discuss the way in which Argentina has recently changed its laws as a 
way to accommodate oil and gas companies seeking to extract oil from 
shale.
11
 
Part IV will establish the regulatory framework in the context of oil and 
gas law. The focus will mainly be directed to environmental laws and 
oversight. 
Parts V and VI will reveal the skeletal property and contract laws in 
China and Argentina, while contrasting them with the fleshed out version 
in the United States. The argument here circles back to the fact that the 
United States’ freedom of contract laws facilitate production and 
economic prosperity, whereas China’s do not.  
II. HISTORICAL AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND ON SHALE OIL AND GAS 
This Part will offer a quick review of what shale is and how the oil and 
gas within it is extracted, followed by an overview of the history and basic 
laws of energy development in the United States, China, and Argentina.   
 
 
 9. Argentina also has significantly large shale reserves. See EIA, supra note 5. 
 10. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the “Top 3” in terms of 
shale gas endowment are China, the U.S., and Argentina. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment of 14 Regions Outside the United States (Apr. 
2011), available at www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/.  
 11.  See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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In simple terms, shale is a rock,
12
 but it is a very valuable
13
 one if 
tapped into properly.
14
 The reason why shale has been on the energy 
industry’s radar is not because engineers and geologists recently 
discovered this type of formation, but because they recently developed the 
technology to stimulate the formation in a cost-effective way.
15
 In fact, 
shale was first tapped into in the 1930s, less than one hundred years after 
the first oil and gas well was drilled at Drake’s Well in Pennsylvania.16 In 
the 1930s, oil and gas producers threw nitroglycerin down the well and 
cracked the rock formation to exploit the resource.
17
 Now, safer and more 
cost-effective technology exists with hydraulic fracturing, changing the 
way we exploit resources.
18
 The process of fracking involves the opening 
of space or cracks within shale through the high pressure application of 
 
 
 12. JOHN S. LOWE, OWEN L. ANDERSON, ERNEST E. SMITH, DAVID E. PIERCE, AND 
CHRISTOPHER S. KULANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW (6th ed. 2013); See 
generally HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 700 (14th 
ed. 2009). Shale is a formation in which oil and gas is formed through intense heat and pressure in 
addition to organic material over time. Id. Most geologists believe 95% of the oil and gas remains in 
rocks which have not been tapped into. Id. Shale is a geographic formation with low permeability and 
the source of hydrocarbons. Id. Development requires some type of well stimulation. Id. 
 13. The International Energy Agency has stated that “[e]nergy developments in the United States 
are profound and their effect will be felt well beyond North America—and the energy sector. The 
recent rebound in US oil and gas production, driven by upstream technologies that are unlocking light 
tight oil and shale gas resources, is spurring economic activity . . . and steadily changing the role of 
North America in global energy trade.” INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 23 
(2012), available at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ publications/weo-2012/. 
 14. See Hydraulic Fracturing, AM. PETROLEUM INST., http://www.api.org/hydraulic fracturing 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2011); see also Advanced Drilling Techniques, AM. PETROLEUM INST., http:// 
www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-overview/exploration-and-production/natural-gas/advanced-drilling. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (explaining “horizontal drilling” techniques). 
 15. See HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE, UNCONVENTIONAL 
CHALLENGES 1 (2008), available at http://www.halliburton.com/en-US/ps/solutions/unconventional-
resources/default.page?node-id=h8cyv98q; See also U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra 
note 10, at 1. Most oilmen owe a debt of gratitude to George Mitchell, a Texas oilman who, through 
years of trial and error, finally developed a cost effective way to tap into shale: “The work of this 
legendary oilman, who died last week at age 94 in Galveston, is the reason the United States is in the 
midst of an energy renaissance.” Father of Fracking George Mitchell Changed a Nation, DALLAS 
NEWS, July 30, 2013, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130730-editorial-
father-of-fracking-george-mitchell-changed-a-nation.ece. 
 16. Lowe, supra note 12, at 2. 
 17. Am. Oil & Gas Historical Society, Shooters—A Fracking History, http://aoghs.org/oilfield-
technologies/shooters-well-fracking-history/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); See also JOHN GRAVES, 
FRACKING: AMERICA’S ALTERNATIVE ENERGY REVOLUTION 101 (2013).  
 18. David Brooks, Shale Gas Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at A31. See also Amy 
Myers Jaffe, How Shale Gas Is Going to Rock the World, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2010, at R1 (“Since 
there’s no longer an urgent need to make [alternative fuels] competitive immediately through 
subsidies, since we can use natural gas now, we can pour that money into R&D-so renewable will be 
ready to compete without lots of help when shale supplies run low, decades from now.”). 
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water, chemicals, and sand.
19
 The cracks open up and the oil or gas seeps 
up through the drill rig.
20
  
With these large-scale operations involving dozens of chemicals and 
drilling hundreds of feet below the surface (and below aquifers), however, 
comes regulation.
21
 And all regulations are not created the same. In the 
United States, regulations surrounding drilling for oil and gas evolved 
from failures in the pure free market system, which created economic 
waste rather than economic prosperity.  
One example is the oil and gas boom in Morrow County, Ohio in the 
1960s, where drill rigs were set up within inches of each other with some 
overlapping with one another in a small area.
22
 This massive oil frenzy 
was due to the lack of regulations on setting up wells and rigs, which 
eventually led to the development of spacing regulations and a duty to not 
interfere with one’s neighbor unreasonably.23 The original lack of spacing 
requirements added to the original framework of drilling helped bolster the 
common law property doctrine of the rule of capture. The famous property 
law case of Pierson v. Post
24
 is an example of “catching” oil and gas.25 
This common law concept does still apply, but with severe limitations, 
such as spacing restrictions, environmental concerns, and regulatory 
framework.
26
 By reducing the number of rigs that could be in a certain 
 
 
 19. GRAVES, supra note 17, at 99; See also id. (for more information on different types of 
fracking, what chemicals might be used, and the history of fracking since the turn of the twentieth 
century). 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Sakmar, supra note 6, at 372 (“So far, Congress has introduced legislation known as the 
‘FRAC Act’ that, if passed, will place stricter regulations on the shale gas industry”).  
 22. Jeff Fort, Ohio’s Oil Boom—Why It Will Be Different This Time, OIL & GAS LAW REPORT 
(Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.oilandgaslawreport.com/2012/08/24/ohios-oil-boom-why-it-
will-be-different-this-time/. 
 23. Id.; See also R.C. 1509.01(I) Spacing regulations (requiring that wells be 1,000 feet apart on 
a 40 acre property, along with the “Doctrine of Correlative Rights,” which states that landowners have 
reciprocal obligations to act in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of their 
neighbors). 
 24. Pierson v. Post, 1805 WL 781, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that occupancy can be 
acquired only by possession). 
 25. Lowe, supra note 12, at 3. 
 26. See Kelly v. Ohio Oil, 39 L.R.A 764 (Ohio 1897) (holding that whatever oil or gas gets into 
the well belongs to the owner of the well, no matter where it came from, even if it was by fraud or 
deceit). As long as the well is lawfully drilled, the driller can keep the resource. Motive does not 
matter. See also THERE WILL BE BLOOD (Paramount Vantage & Miramax Films 2007). See also Harris 
v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 OHIO ST. 118, 127 (1897) (holding that where an oil lease that is silent as to the 
number of wells to be drilled includes an implied covenant that the lessee shall reasonably develop the 
lands and reasonably protect the lines). More recent cases on reducing waste include Coastal Oil & 
Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tex. 2008) (discussing the rule of capture in 
the context of fractures and holding that, where hydraulic fracturing runs onto another’s property, the 
driller, and not the landowner, still claims the oil or gas extracted).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
186    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:181 
 
 
 
 
 
space, states like Ohio reduced problems of waste, resulting in a good 
balance between the free market system and regulation. Texas will be 
another example analyzed later in the context of property laws.
27
 
The history of oil and gas development in China is encapsulated within 
its state-run economic system and cultural beliefs, having changed little 
over the course of its history with drilling, save for the allowance of 
private oil companies recently.
28
 Oil was discovered in China in 1959
29
 
and the state was self-sufficient up until 1993.
30
 After transitioning 
through the Mao Revolution, which led to some changes in regulatory 
models,
31
 China ventured out to import oil and gas, using its cultural 
partnership tactic of “soft power” in making cooperative partnerships with 
other countries in order to import oil and gas.
32
 Soft power is still highly 
emphasized in China, and has been used to develop its own drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing technologies.
33
 Despite the apparent strength of the 
government in China, however, there is a huge gap in environmental 
 
 
 27. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 28. Yong Huang, Shan Jiang, Diana Moss, & Randy Stutz, China’s 2007 Anti-Monopoly Law: 
Competition and the Chinese Petroleum Industry, 31 ENERGY L.J. 337, 339 (2010).  
 29. RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 
113–15 (2010) 
 30. Id. at 113. 
 31. Huang, supra note 28, at 339. 
It has been suggested that . . . the Chinese energy industry has gone through three divisible 
time periods marking three distinct regulatory models. The first period extended from 1949 
until 1982, and consisted of centralized management; the second from 1982 until 1998, 
marked by industrial division, or the creation of SOEs; and the third from 1998 through the 
present, as the Chinese economy has moved from a command-and- control system toward a 
market-based system.  
Wesley N. Harris, China Energy: A Crossroads Historiography, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 255, 274–
75 (2012). 
 32. See BATES GILL & YANZHONG HUANG, Sources and Limits of ‘Chinese Soft Power’, 48 
SURVIVAL 24, 24–26 (2006), available at http:// taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre= 
article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330600765377 (explaining China’s utilization of “soft power” to foster 
productive relationships with other countries). 
 33. Id.; See also Gabrial Dominguez, Soft Power—China’s Expanding Role in the Middle East, 
Apr. 2, 2015, available at http://www.dw.de/soft-power-chinas-expanding-role-in-the-middle-east/a-
18233271. 
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laws
34
 and laws overseeing the safety of drilling. This gap will be 
discussed in more depth later.
35
  
Argentina, unlike China and the United States, has a very different 
history of oscillating between heavy government oversight and complete 
privatization within the energy sector. In the 1980s, the Argentinean 
government controlled the gas and oil industry in its entirety until the 
election of Carlos Menem in 1989, when he took measures to privatize 
industry and increase the value of the peso after a severe spike in inflation 
that swept most of Latin America.
36
 In 2001, the energy industry took 
another turn due to new leadership and a recession, only this time the 
laws
37
 were heavy in regulation.
38
 Then, in 2004, the pendulum swung 
back once again, but not completely.  
The current Argentinian legal framework, known as the Second 
Generation Reforms, developed a happy medium of privatization with 
cautious government oversight in conducting business.
39
 These involved 
incentives for foreign investment
40
 and renewable energy technologies,
41
 
along with some government regulation.
42
 More recently, in 2012, 
Argentina passed a series of laws pertaining to shale called the National 
 
 
 34. See Li Jing, Ex-minister blames China’s pollution mess on lack of rule of law, South CHINA 
MORNING POST (Jan. 21, 2013), available at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ article/1132566/ex-
minister-blames-chinas-pollution-mess-lack-rule-law (explaining that since the 1970s, China has failed 
to abide by the environmental rules it has passed); See also Simon Denyer, Choking smog paralyzes 
cities in northeast China, closing schools, airports, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2013, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/choking-smog-paralyzes-cities-in-northeast-china-closing-schools-
airports/2013/10/22/ba2c46d 6-3b04-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html. 
 35. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 36. Daniel Bianchi, Privatization of the Oil and Gas Industry in Argentina-A Model for Latin 
America?, 39 RMMLF-INST 17 (1993); See also Jay Martin, An Overview of the Privatization of the 
Latin American Oil and Gas Sector, 103A RMMLF-INST 9 (1999) (explaining that the debt crisis in 
Latin America caused some countries to tighten government authority and some to loosen government 
authority); Martin Lythgoe, Renewable Generation in Argentina: Past Failures and A Plan for Future 
Success, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 263, 289 (2009) (discussing Menem’s success in privatizing Argentina’s 
oil and gas industries). 
 37. Law No. 25,561, July 1, 2002, B.O. 
 38. Larry B. Pascal, Summary of Oil and Gas Developments in South America (2006), 13 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 521, 522–23 (2007) (“[I]n December 2001, Argentina passed the Emergency Law, 
revoking its currency board/convertibility policy and officially ending Argentina’s experiment with 
neo-liberal economic policies. Argentina’s economic crisis, felt in all sectors of the economy, affected 
the successful oil and gas industry in a particularly severe way”). 
 39. Martin Lythgoe, Renewable Generation in Argentina: Past Failures and A Plan for Future 
Success, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 263, 304 (2009).  
 40. Law 25,019, Oct. 19, 1998, [29008] B.O. 1, art. 1; Law No. 26190, art. 7. 
 41. Law 26,190, art. 4(a) (defined as “non-fossil energy sources”). 
 42. Law No. 26,190, art. 14 (establishing set premiums over market prices). 
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Plan,
43
 which set the resource’s development as a goal for public policy.44 
It also has these same incentives,
45
 but control over market prices 
remains.
46
  
All three countries have a very diverse history, representing both 
extremes and the middle ground with free markets systems and state-run 
dictatorships. This survey leads me to my first contention: The differences 
in economic systems from the United States are differences which will 
hinder a shale boom in China and Argentina. 
III. ECONOMIC SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF INVESTMENT AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
As this Note is not a review of the current economic system in the 
United States,
47
 I will simply contrast that system with China’s and 
Argentina’s systems.  
China’s economic system is indeed an interesting and complex 
combination of authoritarian leadership with heavy oversight in the 
 
 
 43. Law No. 26,741. 
 44. Id.  
Upon examining of Law No. 26,741, three main issues may be highlighted: (i) Self-
sufficiency in hydrocarbons as a matter of national public policy; (ii) creation of the Federal 
Council on Hydrocarbons; and (iii) The expropriation of 51% of the equity of YPF S.A. and 
Repsol YPF Gas S.A. as public benefit.  
Amalia S enz, Argentina: An Overview of the Argentine Regulatory Framework and Main Changes in 
2012 Scenario: Regulatory Prospects for 2013 in the Light of High Consumer Demand, 2013 NO. 2 
RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 12C, 12C-3 (2013); See also Alex M culus, Shall We Dance an 
Unconventional Tango?, 2013 NO. 2 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 13A , 13A-14 (2013).  
 45. S en   supra note 44, at 12C-4-12C-5. The National Plan outlines a few policy goals which 
are to be implemented by a government committee. These goals include the following: 
(i) An increase and maximization of investments in the exploration, exploitation, refining,  
 transportation and commercialization of hydrocarbons;  
(ii) The integration of public and private, national and foreign, capital into strategic alliances 
aimed at exploring and exploiting conventional and non-conventional hydrocarbons. 
Id. 
 46. Id. at 12C-5.  
 47. Most are familiar with the United States’ economic system being principally free market-
based capitalism with a balance of some government regulation in the context of utilities. For a brief 
discussion on the capitalist system, see generally MIKE O’CONNOR, DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2006) (providing a good overview of both historical and current trends of American 
capitalism in a democratic society); See also John Williamson, Institute for International Economics, A 
Short History of the Washington Consensus (Sept. 24–25, 2004), available at http://www.iie.com/ 
publications/papers/ williamson0904-2.pdf. 
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markets and prolific subsidies to businesses,
48
 but it is not one that is 
conducive to drilling shale domestically. China’s economic system and its 
global influence have been coined the “Beijing Consensus”49 by Joshua 
Cooper Ramo,
50
 and that designation has been adopted by many 
economists, historians, and political scientists.
51
 In response to an article 
entitled the “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,”52 Ramo 
argues that developing countries are not adopting the United States 
economic system; rather, these countries prefer the Chinese model of 
heavy state control combined with government subsidies for companies 
and “soft-power”53 commercial partnerships with nations who will support 
China when asked to do so.
54
  
Arguably, the Beijing Consensus, or China Model, works extremely 
well in the context of exploiting other nation’s resources,55 and likewise 
has guided them through an industrial revolution resulting in technological 
improvements, quality of life improvements, and economic prosperity.
56
 In 
fact, PetroChina and Sinopec, the state-owned oil and gas companies, have 
expanded rapidly in recent years;
57
 however, drilling shale domestically 
 
 
 48. Yang Yao, The End of the Beijing Consensus: Can China’s Model of Authoritarian Growth 
Survive?, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 2, 2010), http://foreignaffaires.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-
beijing-consensus (calling China’s economic model an “unconventional approach to economic 
policy—a combination of mixed ownership, basic property rights, and heavy government 
intervention.”). 
 49. See generally STEFAN HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS, HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN 
MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010). 
 50. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, FOREIGN POL’Y CTR., May 11, 2004, at 1. 
 51. The Beijing consensus is to keep quiet, THE ECONOMIST, May 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16059990. 
 52. See generally Williamson, supra note 47 (arguing that the American economic model has 
had a strong global influence on developing countries).  
 53. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chinese soft power. 
 54. Halper, supra note 49, at 109.  
This kind of diplomatic support was further evident when China sought to thwart Japan’s 
attempt to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In that instance, the Chinese 
mobilized various African states [which had partnered with China economically] . . . to stop 
the summit from endorsing a Japanese seat.  
Id. at 109–10. 
 55. See generally Julie Jiang & Jonathan Sinton, Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil 
Companies, EIA (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/ 
publication/overseas_china.pdf (“Chinese oil companies are now operating in 31 countries and have 
equity production in 20 of these countries, though their equity shares are mostly located in four 
countries: Kazakhstan, Sudan, Venezuela and Angola”).  
 56. Graeme Wearden, Chinese Economic Boom Has Been 30 Years in the Making, The 
Guardian, Aug. 16, 2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/aug/16/chinese-
economic-boom (noting that China’s economy has grown at a ten percent increase rate). 
 57. See Yvonne Lee, Sinopec’s First-Half Net Rises 24%, Outperforming PetroChina, DOW 
JONES BUSINESS NEWS, Aug. 25, 2013, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ sinopecs-
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presents a challenge that foreign economic partnerships simply cannot 
solve alone. There are three economics-based reasons for this.
58
  
The first is that China lacks the technological ingenuity to develop 
ways to explore and produce shale oil and gas over its rocky terrain. 
American National security expert Peter Rodman, along with many others, 
has reasoned that China lacks the notably independent technologic 
ingenuity the United States has always maintained.
59
 While China and its 
state-run oil companies are excellent hunters in the search for oil and gas 
overseas,
60
 they lack the individual entrepreneurial spirit necessary to 
develop ways to exploit their own landscape. This lack of technologic 
ingenuity is apparent in the number of intellectual property rights 
violations China has had in recent years as it tries to develop into a high-
tech country.
61
 In 2009, the United States filed a complaint at the World 
Trade Organization, attempting to point out the violations and reform the 
intellectual property laws in China in order to make it less risky for foreign 
investors.
62
 China did reform its laws,
63
 but many agree that these reforms 
are difficult to implement practically.
64
 In the oil and gas industry, the 
 
 
first-half-net-rises-24-2013-08-25 See also China’s Natural Gas Market Report, PETROMIN 
PIPELINER, http://www.pm-pipeliner.safan.com/mag/ppljanmar13/r16.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) 
(“In 2011, the Chinese NOCs have made 8 gas-related overseas acquisition and investment offers, 
which amounted to around US$12 billion.”). 
 58. Contract arguments are in Part V. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 59. Halper, supra note 49, at 105; See also Donald Zagoria, Between Friendship and Rivalry: 
China and America in the 21st Century, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/54357/donald-zagoria/between-friendship-and-rivalry-china-and-america-in-the-21st-cen (citing 
some of China’s economic and political weaknesses).  
 60. David L.O. Hayward, China’s Oil Supply Dependence, J. OF ENERGY SEC., June 18, 2009, 
available at http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_%20content&view=article& id=197:chinas-
oil-supply-dependence&catid=96:content%20&Itemid=345. 
 61. See Chris Buckley & Jonathan Lynn, China, U.S. trade barbs over WTO piracy case, 
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/20/us-china-usa-wto-
idUSTRE52J3T920090320 (discussing the WTO’s ruling on China’s illegal violations of copyright 
laws and push to reform); See also Mike Bartol and Rick Choate, Doing Business in China: 
Trademark, Patent and Corporate Basics, BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS LLP 2011 (explaining the need 
to protect trademarks, patents, and copyrights when doing business in China); See also Jessica Mintz, 
China, FBI bust software counterfeiters, USA TODAY, July 24, 2007, available at http://usatoday30. 
usatoday.com/tech/products/2007-07-24-98073 5197_x.htm.  
 62. See Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549 (2009); See also Peter K. Yu, The U.S.-China 
Dispute Over Over TRIPS Enforcement, Drake L.R., available at http://www.law.drake.edu/ 
clinicsCenters/ip/docs/ipResearch-op5.pdf. 
 63. Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (issued by the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China on June 5  2008), CHINESE GOV’T’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (June 21, 
2008), http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm. 
 64. Emily Gische, Repercussions of China’s High-Tech Rise: Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights in China, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1393, 1408–09 (2012); See also Office of 
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main reason shale has become cost-effective is the improved technology in 
hydraulic fracturing, which often involves trademarked formulas for the 
frack fluids pushed into the wells
65
 and patented engineering methods.
66
 
The possibility of foreign investors losing that technology to China’s state-
owned companies presents a high risk for them and an obstacle for China 
to drill domestically. 
Continuing along this same line of logic, the second reason why 
China’s economics will hinder domestic success is that China’s state-
owned oil and gas companies do not always operate within the bounds of 
Chinese law, which makes foreign investors, again, hesitant to invest and 
share their technology. Known as “Bamboo Capitalism,”67 it is common 
practice for Chinese companies to tag-team with select private 
entrepreneurs and operate outside of the law.
68
  
Finally, China’s economic structure and “soft-power” decisions hinder 
a domestic shale boom because a significant and disproportional amount 
of infrastructure is invested overseas and not in China domestically.
69
 
Essentially, China will simply run out of the capital to fund a state project 
for drilling, given that foreign investors are hesitant to come to China.
 
To 
an extent, this hesitancy is already occurring.
70
 
 
 
U.S. Trade Rep., 2010 Special 301 Rep. 19 (2010), at 23, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/reports-and-publications/2010-3 (reporting that the enforcement of the new intellectual 
property laws in China has been “hampered by poor coordination among Chinese government 
ministries and agencies, local protectionism and corruption, high thresholds for initiating 
investigations and prosecuting criminal cases, lack of training, and inadequate and non-transparent 
processes.”). See also Veronica Weinstein & Dennis Fernandez, Recent Developments in China’s 
Intellectual Property Laws, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 227, 228 (2004); Julia Ya Qin, The Impact of WTO 
Accession on China’s Legal System: Trade  Investment and Beyond 20–22 (Wayne St. U. L. Sch. 
Legal Stud., Research Paper Series No. 07-15, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=985321. 
 65. Until recently, most drilling companies had protected the frack fluid formulas under trade 
secrets, but recently twenty-one U.S. states have adopted disclosure rules, which will ultimately lead to 
companies filing their formulas under trademarks or patents. See Jeff Tollefson, Secrets of Fracking 
Fluids Pave the Way for Cleaner Recipe, SCIENTIFIC AMERICA (Sept. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=secrets-of-fracking-fluids-pave-way-for-cleaner-recipe. 
 66. See supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text. 
 67. Bamboo Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://www.economist. 
com/node/18332610. 
 68. Id.; See also Let a Million Flowers Bloom, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18330120 (briefing of several private entrepreneurs who are 
operating outside of China’s laws and regulations); See generally PITTMAN POTTER, CHINA’S LEGAL 
SYSTEM 92 (2013), (discussing China’s preferred, informal relationship with investors, known as 
“guanxi”). 
 69. See Hayward, supra note 60.  
 70. As of 2013, the only foreign investor pouring a significant amount of capital into China’s 
shale reserves was RoyalDutch Shell. Unfortunately, they have not had much success in producing 
from the formations, despite already spending billions of dollars. Brian Spegele and Justin Scheck, 
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Argentina, on the other hand, does not have all of the same problems 
China has in the context of state-run economics, but it does have some 
issues that might discourage foreign investors. Argentinean oil and gas 
companies are in fact nationally owned, but they have been significantly 
deregulated since the 1990s,
71
 as mentioned in the historical section of this 
Note.
72
 Still, the country maintains a burdensome tax regime imposed on 
oil and gas producers (foreign and domestic), making it costly for 
investors to set up rigs in Argentina.
73
 Additionally, there is a twelve 
percent royalty given to the state for all sales of hydrocarbons.
74
 The real 
reason for these taxes is fairly transparent: Argentina is still strapped with 
debt, recovering from a 2002 recession.
75
 With high debt, and a history of 
high inflation,
76
 Argentina is a huge risk for foreign investors.
77
 It would 
appear that the economy simply could not support the rapid development 
the United States has generated.  
Overall, while the Chinese market might be favorable to investments 
overseas, the economy cannot handle domestic drilling and shale 
investments. Furthermore, in Argentina, huge debt and uncertainty detracts 
from the likelihood of any economic revitalization. In the United States, 
the economy and free market system support innovation and attract 
investors.
78
 Men like George Mitchell,
79
 the oilman who found a cost 
effective way to tap into shale through horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
 
 
Energy-Hungry China Struggles to Join Shale-Gas Revolution, THE WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2013, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323980604579030883246871124 
[hereinafter China Faces Steep Climb to Exploit Its Shale Riches]; See also Katie Hunt, China Faces 
Steep Climb to Exploit its Shale Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/10/01/business/energy-environment/china-faces-steep-climb-to-exploit-its-shale-riches.html? 
pagewanted=1. 
 71. José Martínez de Hoz, Tomás Lanardonne, & Alex Máculus, Shale We Dance an 
Unconventional Tango?, 6(3) J. OF WORLD ENERGY LAW & BUS. 179, 179–209 (2013) [hereinafter 
Shale We Dance].  
 72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 73. Shale We Dance, supra note 71 (internal citations omitted). The 35% tax rate applies to legal 
entities and Argentine branches of foreign entities. Id. Individuals are subject to progressive rates, the 
top one being 35%. Id. 
 74. See Law No. 17319, June 23, 1967, [Title II, Art. 59] (Arg.). 
 75. Katie Linthicum, Argentina’s policies hinder development of vast oil  gas reserves, LA 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/30/world/la-fg-argentina-
economy-20130830. 
 76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See generally CARL J. SCHRAMM, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL IMPERATIVE (2006); See also 
Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 289–90 (1999) 
(concluding that the entrepreneurial myth, or American Dream, holds true in Silicon Valley). 
 79. See supra note 15. 
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fracturing, would never have taken the risk in experimenting with 
technology under a state-run economy, where failing would have damaged 
the public welfare, as opposed to private interests in the United States. 
Even then, investors are somewhat protected by United States laws.
80
 
Additionally, the relative certainty that companies operate within the 
boundaries of the law—and that the laws will be enforced81—lowers the 
risk in developing shale in the United States. Overall, the United States 
has struck the correct balance given the booming economy of shale 
development.
82
 
The uncertainty in authoritarian-centered economies in both Argentina 
and China presents a risk to investors, which leads me to my next 
contention: the environmental regulatory frameworks in both China and 
Argentina are unpredictable and unstable, which also present a risk to 
investors that will hinder successful domestic shale production. 
IV. THE REGULATORY REGIME: ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS 
This Part discusses the difficulties in navigating administrative law in 
China and Argentina, and it also goes into depth about why a lack of 
environmental laws is actually something that will hinder shale 
development in those countries. 
As China’s economy has flourished, concern about and oversight of the 
environment has wilted. Air pollution, smog, and thick clouds of dust 
currently hover over northern provinces, causing people to either wear 
masks outside or move out of the province entirely.
83
 Although most of the 
 
 
 80. D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law and Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 358–63 (2006) (pointing out entrepreneurs’ninterest in protecting 
investors). 
 81. Id. See also Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret Laws and Non-
Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 323 (2006) (noting that the United 
States has successfully balanced laws which might otherwise compete with entrepreneurship and 
innovation, such as the interaction between trade secrets rules and intellectual property or non-
competition laws).  
 82. Id. See also Keith Robinson, Purdue Study: Shale Oil and Gas a Long-term Boon to 
Economy, PURDUE UNIVERSITY (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2013/Q4/ 
purdue-study-shale-oil-and-gas-a-long-term-boon-to-economy.html (concluding that “[t]he increasing 
production of shale oil and gas should benefit the U.S. economy by raising the nation’s gross domestic 
product by an average of 3.5 percent annually through 2035”). 
 83. Li, supra note 34; see also China Seeks to Curb Worst Air Pollution in 50 years, THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 18, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2013/dec/18/china-air-pollution-smog; see also Yin Lu, Fleeing the Pollution, GLOBAL TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2013, available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/833495.shtml#.UrdgprSKbkg. 
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blame has been directed at coal,
84
 the environmental damage has already 
occurred, making the development of natural gas significantly more 
difficult.
85
 Additionally, the peculiar structure of administrative law in 
China
86
 hinders innovative environmental laws and also places public 
health and safety low on the list of priorities.
87
  
The basic structure of administrative law in China is the antithesis of 
the American regulatory state.
88
 Known as a “top-down” structure,89 
nearly all of Chinese regulatory law is made through bureaucrats passing 
regulations rather than judge-made law from plaintiff litigation or 
legislatively-made law.
90
 Because of this top-heavy system, the 
 
 
 84. Coal Blamed for Heavy Pollution, GLOBAL TIMES, Dec. 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99 /ID/833572/Coal-blamed-for-heavy-pollution.aspx. 
 85. Brian Spegele & Justin Scheck, Energy-Hungry China Struggles to Join Shale-Gas 
Revolution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001 
424127887323980604579030883246871124. Fracking has also presented water pollution issues, as 
many of the drilling sites are located in more agricultural areas. Id. Crops are either dying, or the water 
sources from nearby are contaminated. Id.  
 86. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 87. See 190 Million Chinese Drinking Polluted Water, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Apr. 22, 2011, available 
at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/98649/7359043.html. 
 88. Litigators on behalf of the NRDC attended an environmental conference in China and 
reported that “[b]asic precepts of the American legal system—such as the notion that judges must 
enforce the positive law and cannot allow the use of illegal means to achieve political benefits, or 
economic gain or high moral benefit—seemed novel to many of the Chinese lawyers participating in 
the conference.” Environmental Law in China, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (Dec. 19, 
2006), http://www.nrdc.org/international/ochinalaw.asp;. 
 89. Joel B. Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership?, 35 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2010). The top-down structure has been widely criticized for 
its weak implementation by local officials. Many are subject to political pressure, falsify reports, and 
officially close down plants which violate environmental regulations, only to secretly reopen them. 
Some officials would even close down all plants in the area for months before the deadlines for reports 
in order to meet the energy standards. This was called lazha xiandian, meaning “to pull the breakers 
and limit power.” [Forced Power Outages Flourishing Everywhere, Five Major Unresolved 
Questions], [Red Net] (Nov. 11, 2010), http:// hlj.rednet.cn/c/2010/11/11/2108956.htm. 
 90. Environmental Law in China, supra note 88.  
 If the U.S. federal bureaucracy were equivalent in scope to China’s, it would include: the 
entire U.S. cabinet, state governors and their deputies, the mayors of major cities, the heads of 
all federal regulatory agencies, the chief executives of GE, Exxon-Mobile, Wal-Mart and 
about fifty of the remaining largest U.S. companies, the justices on the Supreme Court, the 
editors of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, the bosses 
of the TV networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big 
universities, and the heads of think-tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Heritage 
Foundation.  
Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitmacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 
37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 379 (2013). 
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implementation of the regulations passed has been notoriously weak.
91
 
Although China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan has outlined many new 
environmental standards,
92
 the corruption resulting from the top-down 
cadre system has not made it effective.
93
 A lack of local officials 
supporting national environmental policies has led to fraud, bribery, and 
cutting corners.
94
 As a result, drill sites have been set up in the middle of 
farms, water is polluted, and crowded villages must live with noise 
pollution from natural gas drilling and fracking.
95
 Thus, while strong 
national policy is in place, local enforcement is fragmented.
96
 
The legal difficulties involved in basic enforcement for drilling will 
cost China significantly. Some legal scholars claim the next Five-Year 
Plan promises tighter enforcement,
97
 but the enforcement and clean-up 
 
 
 91. “One provincial environmental official recounted how their department had become aware of 
a power plant that was surreptitiously turning off its desulfurization equipment in order to save energy 
and other operating costs. Before they could organize an enforcement effort against the enterprise, the 
provincial bureau in charge of energy efficiency work issued a public commendation honoring the 
factory for its efficient use of energy.” Id. at 422. 
 92. Id. at 367. “China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan committed to . . . a 20% energy-intensity 
reduction target. In December 2009 . . . China pledged to implement the domestic binding target of 
reducing carbon emissions by 40–45% by 2020, compared to the 2005 level.” Hao Zhang, China’s 
Energy Conservation and Carbon Emissions Reduction System: Development and Status Quo of the 
Regulatory and Institutional Framework, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10260, 10262 (2012); 
See also Letter from Director General, Department of Climate Change, National Development and 
Reform Commission, China, to Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat, Germany (Jan. 28, 2010), 
available at http:// www.chinafaqs.org /files/chinainfo/China_CPH_Accord_Submission_Letter.pdf. 
 93. See generally Wyatt F. Golding, Incentives for Change: China’s Cadre System Applied to 
Water Quality, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 399, 425 (2011). Here, Golding explains and criticizes the 
cadre system in dealing with water pollution in China. Id. Additionally, the author offers incentives for 
improving the system, which include accurate reporting measures, excluding local officials from 
becoming stakeholders in certain projects, and making data more transparent for citizen involvement. 
Id.  
 94. See supra notes 89, 90 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra note 85; See also China Faces Steep Climb to Exploit Its Shale Riches, supra note 
70. 
 96. See Danny Marks, China’s Climate Change Policy Process: Improved but Still Weak and 
Fragmented, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 971 (2010); Yiping Fang & Yong Zeng, Balancing Energy and 
Environment: The Effect and Perspective of Management Instruments in China, 32 ENERGY 2247 
(2007). 
 97. Hao Zhang, China’s Energy Conservation and Carbon Emissions Reduction System: 
Development and Status Quo of the Regulatory and Institutional Framework, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS 
& ANALYSIS 10260, 10266–67 (2012). Zhang reminds the readers that the “Chinese climate change 
law regime is in its infancy.” Id. He also adds that over the last two decades, China has increased 
environmental policies in number. Id. Additionally, the author argues that the cause of the 
fragmentation in local and national policies can be attributed to the 1990s decentralization of the post-
Mao regime. Id. See generally KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL & DAVID M. LAMPTON, BUREAUCRACY, 
POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA (1992). Others are equally hopeful for China’s 
new Five-Year Plan. See generally Stephen S. Roach, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. 
Tactics, MORGAN STANLEY (Apr. 2011), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ cbl/China_12th_ 
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will come too late for a successful shale revolution. It is already estimated 
the air pollution clean-up hovering over Beijing will cost trillions of yuan 
or 160 million U.S. dollars.
98
 The much needed time and money spent to 
resolve its pollution issues will certainly slow down China’s involvement 
in the shale revolution and prevent them from having the same economic 
boom as the United States. Additionally, even without current pollution, 
the extraction of shale requires careful disposal of frack fluid in order to 
prevent water pollution.
99
 Without local oversight, pollution in China will 
persist and make the economic viability of shale worthless. 
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency and state 
natural resource departments regulate the extraction of shale
100
 and other 
practices that cause pollution. Without going into the controversies over 
whether there is enough regulation,
101
 the present regulatory regime for 
frack fluid disposal is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
which is a detailed command-and-control regulatory program for materials 
classified as “hazardous waste” under the EPA’s regulations.102 For 
example, a Class II injection well is one of three ways to dispose of the 
fluid used in hydraulic fracturing.
103
 A Class II injection well is essentially 
 
 
Five_Year_Plan.pdf (describing the new plan as a “watershed event in the development of modern 
China”). 
 98. Lauren Holdcroft, Beijing’s Pollution Clean-Up Plan will Cost Almost a Trillion Yuan, 
SHANGHAIIST (Oct. 20, 2013), http://shanghaiist.com/2013/10/20/beijings_five_ year_plan_to_clean_ 
up.php. 
 99. See supra note 85. 
 100. There is some debate over whether at the present moment there is enough regulation for shale 
drilling in place. For example, “Shale Play” recently ran a large story about the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources affirming the revocation of D&L Energy’s drilling permits in Youngstown, Ohio 
for illegally dumping frack fluid next to a fault, causing an earthquake. John Funk, Waste-Water 
Inection Well Caused 12 Earthquakes in Ohio, Invesitfation Shows, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/03/shale_gas_drilling_caused_smal.html See also 
Brenda J. Linert, Two Indicted in Ohio Brine Dumping Case, SHALE PLAY: MARCELLUS AND UTICA 
SHALE NEWS (Mar. 1, 2013), www.shaleplayohiovalley.com/page/content.detail/id/500532/Two-. The 
news article questioned whether there were enough regulations in place to prevent private companies 
from illegally dumping frack fluid. Id. Additionally, documentaries and films such as Gasland and 
Promised Land have sparked debate over whether the United States’ practices are safe and 
environmentally sound. Ideas for reform include federal legislation such as the FRAC Act, which 
would mandate drilling companies to disclose the chemicals in and quantities of frack fluid, and 
lobbying efforts “to repeal the SDWA’s hydraulic fracturing exception since the Energy Policy Act 
passed in 2005.” Rebecca Jo Reser & David T. Ritter, State and Federal Legislation and Regulation of 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 57 THE ADVOC. (Texas) 31, 33 (2011). 
 101. See supra note 100.  
 102. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–580 (1976), 90 Stat. 2795. 
 103. Id. The other ways include separating the fluids through evaporation, or gathering the used 
fluid back up from the rig, diluting it with freshwater, and piping it to another project as a way to use it 
again.  
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an empty vertical well, which has been deemed a disposal site by the EPA 
under the Clean Water Act and through a permit called the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.
104
 The injection wells are 
constantly monitored by individual states’ Department of Natural 
Resources in compliance with the EPA, and, among other precautions, the 
wells cannot be close to faults or contaminate freshwater aquifers.
105
 
Additionally, frack fluids are never exposed to outside air and are injected 
well-below impermeable rock formations.
106
 
These regulations have been successful due to the United States’ 
bottom-up structure that encompasses both state and federal enforcement. 
Additionally, plaintiff litigation by environmental groups has made this 
administrative structure successful at balancing the interests of the 
environment and the interests of economic development. For example, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)107 serves as an index of the 
environmental effects agencies must consider before moving forward with 
a project on state land.
108
 NEPA, like its Chinese equivalent, is a federal 
policy, but all federal, state and local agencies alike must take certain 
steps
109
 in assessing environmental damage before approving a project 
 
 
 104. Lowe, supra note 12, at 856–57. 
 105. Id. See also supra note 100 (discussing the illegal dumping of frack fluid in Youngstown, 
which reportedly caused an earthquake). 
 106. Lowe, supra note 12, at 856–57.  
 107. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 USCA § 4321 (1969). “NEPA was 
born in an era that had faith in bureaucratic comprehensive rationality, the idea that predictive analysis 
of a broad class of administrative decisions would produce a rational decision making that would 
consider environmental impacts.” Daniel Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A 
Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 294 (2010). 
 108. Mandelker, supra note 107, at 293; See also S102(2)(C) (“Congressional reasons for 
adopting NEPA are not entirely clear, but the consensus is that NEPA was adopted to limit so-called 
program, or mission-oriented agencies that carried out agency programs at the expense of the 
environment.”). See also DANIEL MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 
2011). For additional information on the history of NEPA litigation in the United States as well as how 
other statutes on land use balance out economics and protect the environment, see generally Matt 
McKeown, Using NEPA and Other Federal Land Management Statutes to Analyze Air Quality 
Impacts, NO. 1 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 5 (2013); Michael C. Blumm & Marla Nelson, Pluralism 
and the Environment Revisited: The Role of Comment Agencies in Nepa Litigation, 37 VT. L. REV. 5 
(2012). 
 109. Mandelker, supra note 107, at 293. See also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. 
United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., writing):  
NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal 
agency and department. The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, had continually 
asserted, prior to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern itself with the adverse 
environmental effects of its actions. Now, however, its hands are no longer tied. It is not only 
permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values into account.  
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such as drilling, mining, or even building a highway.
110
 If an agency does 
not consider the environmental effects according to the guidelines in 
NEPA, it will likely be hauled into court by an environmental group where 
a judge will decide whether the agency abused its discretion.
111
 
Furthermore, NEPA and other land use statutes alike ensure that 
environmental protection will not go so far as to trump a pronounced long-
term economic benefit, such as shale development,
112
 coal development, or 
a highway project.
113
 
There is no such check or balance in China, making it difficult to 
enforce national policies without local involvement or plaintiff litigation. 
Additionally, with shale specifically, the United States has already seen 
 
 
 110. Prior to NEPA, “[e]xisting agencies were established to supervise the development of our 
natural resources consistent with the ethic which has prevailed throughout this country’s history and, 
thus, they tended to overstress the benefits of development and to explore insufficiently the less 
environmentally detrimental alternatives to current methods of meeting their programmed objectives.” 
Dan Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert 
Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee  Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 658 (1972).  
 111. For more information on the role of NEPA and its development, see L. CALDWELL, THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE (1998); Symposium, NEPA 
at 40: How a Visionary Statute Confronts 21st Century Impacts, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. (ELI) 10615 
(2009); Linda Luther, CRS 33152, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 34–35 (2005), available at http://www.enviro-lawyer.com/ NEPASummary.pdf; 
James A. Connaughton, Modernizing the National Environmental Policy Act: Back to the Future, 12 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2003); James T. B. Trip & Nathan G. Alley, Streamlining NEPA’s 
Environmental Review Process: Suggestions for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74 (2003); 
Lynton Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1998); Stephanie Pollack, Reimagining NEPA: Choices for 
Environmentalists, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (1985). For studies of NEPA practices in federal 
agencies see William Funk, NEPA at Energy: An Exercise in Legal Narrative, 20 ENVTL. L. 759 
(1990); Note, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choice 
and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. LEGIS. 229 (1990). 
 112. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368, 1381 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
plan submitted by lessees under prototype oil shale leasing program was sufficiently detailed and did 
not violate NEPA); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that the Mineral Licensing Act cannot be read to impose a mandate to 
employ certain technologies for shale leasing, even if they are economically viable)..  
 113. For NEPA cases holding that agencies can consider cost and cost-effectiveness in rejecting 
certain environmental alternatives, see City of Grapevine, Tex. v. Department of Transp., 17 F.3d 
1502, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that it is permissible for an agency to consider the economic 
goals of a project); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1193–94 (D. Nev. 
2004) (concluding that the agency was not arbitrary and capricious in refusing to consider a fixed 
guideway alternative because the alternative evaluated did not meet the project’s Purpose and Need 
when it was too costly); See also Alliance for Legal Action v. F.A.A., 69 Fed.Appx 617, 622–23 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that it was permissible under NEPA for the agency to consider only the 
alternatives which support effective cargo hub operations where the project’s Purpose and Need was to 
minimize delays and enhance airport operations). 
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shale-specific litigation
114
 which may further perfect the delicate balance 
between protecting the environment or the health and safety of citizens, on 
the one hand, and leading a unique economic revolution, on the other. 
Some might argue that the United States does not have enough 
regulation.
115
 An alternative model is the regulatory regime in Argentina, 
where there has been a longstanding history of strong environmental 
protection laws since the 1881 enactment of Law 2797 prohibiting the 
dumping of waste or sewage into Argentinian waters.
116
 Many claim 
Argentina’s regulatory structure is far more developed and organized than 
that of the United States due to its use of national, provincial, and 
municipal agencies to enforce policies; however, other label it as 
confusing and inefficient overall.
117
 Regardless, the basic framework of 
environmental law is similar to the United States. For example, 
Argentinean agencies are generally
118
 required to compose Environmental 
Impact Assessments, as agencies do under NEPA. There are also well-
established environmental and public safety laws in place;
119
 however, 
case precedent indicates that Argentina’s environmental laws are too strict 
to promote the economic benefit of shale development. One example 
involves an Argentinian agency prohibiting a cell phone tower from being 
 
 
 114. Earl Hagstrom, Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation Is on the Rise, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
DIGEST, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.sedgwicklaw.com/hydraulic-fracturing-litigation-is-on-
the-rise-09-19-2011/; See also Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F. Supp. 2d 109 (N.D.N.Y. 
2011); Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 213 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 115. See Resser & Ritter, supra note 100.  
 116. The Environmental Laws in Argentina, ALFARO LAW, http://www.alfarolaw.com/tapa/ 
The%20Environmental%20Laws%20in%20Argentina.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). (Sewage and 
harmful waste from industrial plants shall not be discharged into the rivers of the Argentine Republic 
unless they are previously submitted to an effective purification process.” Law No. 2797; See also the 
first Argentinean case on environmental protection: “The Barracas Slaughter Houses” [1887] 
(prohibiting the slaughter house from disposing of their waste in the Riachuelo River until they 
adopted more hygienic measures). 
 117. Silvia C. Nonna, The Environment and Its Regulation in Argentina, National Register of 
Generators and Operators of Hazardous Waste Coordinator, Secretariat of Environment and 
Sustainable Development, San Martin 459, 1° Subs., Buenos Aires, Argentina 59, available at 
http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings1/PreceedingsBook%20%20%20%20%20%2059-72.pdf (“Taking 
into account the overlapping roles among the National Government and local administrations and the 
frequent changes of institutional structures, the general scenario shows different legal requirements 
and authorities competing for enforcement resources and responsibility”). 
 118. Although there is no national law in Argentina requiring Environmental Impact Assessments, 
there are equivalent provincial laws in force. Id. at 61–62. 
 119. Some examples include Law on Industrial and Service Activities Waste Management (Law 
25,612); Law on National Environmental Policy (Law 25,675); Law on Polychlorinated Biphenyls—
Standards for Management and Elimination (Law 25,670); Law on the use of Public Waters (Law 
25,688); Law on access to environmental information (Law 25,831); Law on Residential Waste (Law 
25,916); Law on Environmental Protection of Native Forests (Law 26,331). 
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built because it would allegedly harm the environment.
120
 Similar cases 
have followed.
121
 
In the context of shale regulation, laws similar to those in the U.S., 
including the Hazardous Waste Law and the General Environmental Law, 
govern shale exploration.
122
 However, the Argentinian government has 
been controlling oil and gas prices at depressed levels since around 
2002.
123
 This strong control has simultaneously deterred foreign investors 
from entering the Argentinian shale market, leading to more price 
regulation.
124
 On the other hand, after such a long tradition of being an 
environmentally conscientious state, many locals have voiced their 
opposition, including Argentine Nobel Peace laureate Adolfo Perez 
Esquivel who claims YPF, the state-run oil company, has been 
polluting.
125
 
Despite the seemingly overprotective measures and enforcement in 
place, there is some question as to whether they are being implemented 
effectively. Many of the statutes passed nationally are only “minimum 
provisions,” meaning provincial and municipal agencies have broad 
discretion as to how to comply.
126
 Finally, because Argentina is a civil law 
country, there is no plaintiff litigation to work out difficulties in 
enforcement or the effectiveness of the regulation. There is promise in the 
government revisiting “Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment” 
(WEEE) in regards to fracking in the Vaca Muerta and Neuquèn shale 
regions.
127
 Again, though, with either overprotective measures or jumbled 
 
 
 120. Giménez Juan Ramon c. Telecom [2008]. 
 121. See Agüero c. Municipalidad de Cañuelas [2007] (suspending the installment of a cell phone 
tower planned to be erected close to a kindergarten), available at http://www.kaplankirsch.com/files/ 
Comparative%20Law%20-%20Argentinean.pdf (last visited June 14, 2015); CO.DE.CI. [2005] 
(suspending the development of a mining project).  
 122. Law No. 24,051 and Law No. 25,675. See also NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, SHALE GAS 
HANDBOOK 19 (2013), available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/norton-rose-fulbright-
shale-gas-handbook-108992.pdf. 
 123. See supra note 42. 
 124.  Argentina: A Step-by-Step Walk in the Road Toward the Shale Miracle?, KING & SPALDING, 
ENERGY NEWSLETTER, Jan. 10, 2014, available at http://www.jdsupra.com/ legalnews/argentina-a-
step-by-step-walk-in-the-ro-51849/ (“In the case of natural gas, the Government, through the 
“Commission for Strategic Planning and Coordination of the National Hydrocarbon Investment Plan” 
(the “Commission”), implemented a package of measures whereby the Government basically pays to 
producers the difference between the “market-interfered” price . . . and a guaranteed minimum price 
. . . “). 
 125. Liliana Samuel, Shale Oil Boom Fuel Argentina’s Dreams, PSYS.ORG (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://phys.org/news/ 2013-10-shale-oil-boom-fuel-argentina.html#jCp. 
 126. Nonna, supra note 117.  
 127. Environmental Law and Practice in Argentina: An Overview, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL 
SOLUTION (Oct. 1, 2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/8-500-1340. Additionally, “[i]n Patagonia, where 
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enforcement, Argentina does not appear to have struck the right balance 
for an economic shale boom. A clearer policy direction in the future might 
help them achieve it, though.  
Overall, it would appear that the United States has well-established 
oversight in place, which has proven effective through legislation and 
plaintiff litigation. China does not have such a system, and they will (and 
have begun to) pay the price for the environmental damage and lack of 
regulatory enforcement. Argentina offers a potential model for the tighter 
regulation some Americans wish to see in the United States; however, in 
past cases, that regulation has either halted economic prosperity or been 
completely ignored. 
V. PROPERTY LAW AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 
Perhaps the easiest difference to identify between the United States, 
China, and Argentina is that only one permits its citizens to own, lease, 
and sell land. This country is the United States, but over time, Argentina 
and China have relinquished some powers of ownership from the State to 
the citizens, albeit in a controlled manner.  
In China, property law has slowly been moving from public to private 
since the Mao Revolution. From 1949 to around the late 2000s, 
communism dominated Chinese culture where private property 
symbolized the bourgeoisie and everything wrong with capitalism.
128
 In 
2007, after years of revisions and debates,
129
 the National People’s 
Congress of China passed the Property Law of China,
130
 making property 
rights available to citizens. Some parties expressed hope with this new 
law, while others expressed strong suspicion.
131
 The assessment in this 
 
 
most of the hydrocarbon activity takes place specific rulings applicable to non-conventional 
exploration techniques (shale gas and shale oil, tight gas sands, and so on) are expected to come into 
force, with particular emphasis on the sustainable use of water resources.” Id. Even so, there do not 
appear to be any recent statutes passed on the subject of shale. 
 128. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the 
Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317, 321 (2008). Zhang asserts that 
private property rights were only repressed by the PRC until China’s Opening Door Policy in 1978, 
but that policy only led to exploring freedoms, not citizen private property rights. Id. 
 129. Id. at 321–23. 
 130. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property Rights Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 
1, 2007), translation available at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/ resource-centre/laws-and-
regulations/general/property-rights-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html. 
 131. “The latest law is only one step in the slow trudge China is making out of the blind alley of 
Maoism . . . But the constitution is less a prescriptive document than a constantly changing description 
of what has just happened. So nothing changed.” China’s Next Revolution, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 
2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/8815075. 
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Note shares the same suspicion, especially in the context of land rights; 
despite the 2007 law, China does not allow citizens to own or market 
land.
132
 Even though the law makes land use rights available, it does not 
allow for owners to use the resources below the land.
133
 Possibly the most 
basic, historic, and essential property right out of all the bundle of sticks 
still does not exist in China, and it proves a large hurdle in mirroring 
America’s shale revolution. 
For one, China has proved itself deficient in enforcing national laws 
locally. The lack of enforcement for national environmental laws may be 
an indication of how the national property laws will be enforced, or will 
not be.
134
 With a lack of enforcement, land use rights are meaningless. 
Peasants working lands cannot even “use their land as security on which 
they could borrow and invest to boost productivity.”135 Without citizen 
participation to spur an efficient use of the land as a whole, the economic 
benefits will remain untapped.  
Even though there is no citizen participation, the Chinese government 
has been successfully portioning off land to set up rigs and explore the 
shale reserves. Some might argue it has been easier to explore shale 
without land use rights, but reports show it has not worked out as fluidly 
as one would expect. I mentioned news reports
136
 earlier in this Note 
regarding the pollution of agricultural lands and waters, and those same 
arguments apply under property law. Without effective regulations in 
place concerning land use, it will be easy for the government to take 
possession of the land and then use it for all of its resources, causing the 
same problems coal has caused with environmental pollution. In this case, 
the issue would be land devastation and ultimately not using the land as 
efficiently as it could be when drilling.
137
  
Finally, this point ties back to where we began with citizen 
participation. With the new property laws in place, some citizens have 
begun pushing back against government takings of property. One famous 
 
 
 132. Id. “Indeed, [this law] will not meet the most crying need: to give peasants marketable 
ownership rights to the land they farm.” See supra note 128, 129.  
 133. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国土地管理法) [Land 
Administrative Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Ministry of Land & 
Resources, Aug. 29, 1998), translation available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/ 
200710/t20071011_656321.htm; see also PATRICK RANDOLPH & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE 
LAW 19 (2000), at 85. 
 134. See supra note 96.  
 135. See supra note 131. 
 136. See supra note 95.  
 137. Fort, supra note 22. 
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case, known as the “Nail House,” garnered international attention as a 
husband and wife in the city of Chongqing fought to receive higher 
compensation for their home against expropriation by the Chinese 
government.
138
 In the end, after the Property Laws passed, the couple 
received higher compensation through settlement and simultaneously 
ensured that private property rights are now a dominant culture in 
China.
139
 This litigation represents another point, however. Without citizen 
participation through private land use development in the shale revolution, 
actions brought by citizens demanding compensation will bog down the 
Chinese government, preventing an economically viable end result from 
drilling. 
The United States contrasts almost entirely from China’s property law, 
and though the mineral rights laws vary from state to state, I will look at 
the ever-popular oil and gas state of Texas as well as the federal laws.  
As mentioned earlier,
140
 the ad coelum doctrine is a common law 
concept of property ownership, where the landowner owns everything 
above the surface of his land to the heavens and everything below the 
surface of his land to hell. This concept, having been reiterated in Del 
Monte Mining, plays out in reality where the owner of a piece of land has 
the right to all the oil and gas he extracts through wells located on his 
property. Even in this early case demonstrating the ad coelum doctrine, 
there was a slight modification in dictum, where if the owner extracts 
resources from his neighbor’s land, as long as the well is on his property 
and not his neighbors, it is lawful. That dictum illustrates the rule of 
capture, mentioned at the beginning of this Note.
141
 Conceptually, and in 
common law, when ad coelum combines with the rule of capture, oil and 
gas law is modified to allow a landowner to capture oil and gas from 
beneath his neighbor’s land so long as the well is on his property. The 
common law was further modified by the doctrine of correlative rights, 
which establishes that landowners have reciprocal obligations to act in a 
manner that does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of their 
neighbors. 
 
 
 138. Dennis Schmelzer, Takings for Granted: The Convergence and Non-Covergence of Property 
Law in the People’s Republic of China and the United States, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 133, 136–
37 (2008). “Their two-year legal battle to save their property might have gone unnoticed in China if 
not for the photographs of their home that emerged in online sources, which made the building look 
like a nail that could not be pulled out of the construction site.” Id. at 137. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See discussion supra note 26. 
 141. Id. 
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The common law was further refined by the states. In light of the rise 
in horizontal drilling, the Supreme Court of Texas faced a clash between 
the modification of ad coelum and the rule of capture in Coastal Oil & 
Gas Corp v. Garza Energy Trust.
142
 There, the court held that if fracture 
lines from hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling reach another’s 
unleased property line and oil or gas is extracted over that property line, 
the rule of capture still applies. Justice Willett’s concurrence gives a 
convincing explanation for why the court upheld the rule of capture, 
reasoning it leads to economic freedom, growth in new technology, and 
good income from severance taxes in the State of Texas.
143
  
Justice Willet illustrates why the shale revolution in the United States 
works. The economy relies on oil and gas production, and any state will 
not see economic growth if the courts inhibit areas where oil and gas can 
be extracted.
144
 Furthermore, there must be a fine balance between 
regulations and court holdings that encourage safety and prevent 
unreasonable interferences, but with horizontal drilling and fracking, those 
are taken care of well below the surface. Additionally, allowing 
technology to be used encourages more technologic developments and 
perhaps even safer, non-evasive ways of producing oil and gas. Finally, 
the individual negotiations with landowners who own their own land 
rights foster competition and maintain a mutually beneficial balance 
between economy and citizen rights, which I will also discuss in the 
contracts section.
145
 
Argentina experiences many of the same struggles China has under 
property law, given there is no individual property ownership. Unlike 
China, however, Argentina has specific property laws concerning 
hydrocarbon exploration. Law No. 17,319
146
 was further refined in 2007 
under Law No. 26,197 whereby the power to grant exploration permits can 
be either in the hands of the national government or local provinces.
147
 
 
 
 142. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
 143. Id. at 27 (Willett, J., concurring). 
 144. Id.  
 145. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. Laurent Poncet of Statoil, discussing negotiating 
with landowners in the United States, stated: “In a sense it’s a pain because you have to negotiate 
rights with so many stakeholders and sign so many checks at the end of the month, but at the same 
time we are under scrutiny all the time, so you have to go in and do a good job.”. Jeff McMahon, Six 
Reasons Fracking Has Flopped Overseas, FORBES, April 7, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jeffmcmahon/2013/04/07/six-reasons-fracking-has-flopped-overseas/.  
 146. Law No. 17,319 dictates that oil and gas fields belong solely to the government and are 
separate from surface land use rights. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 122, at 14–16. 
 147. Id.  
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Under this law, once the oil and/or gas has been extracted, the product 
belongs to the usually government-owned company.
148
 The transportation, 
marketing, and sale is also heavily regulated under the Hydrocarbon Law 
by the Secretariat of Energy.
149
 As in China, there is little citizen 
participation regarding mineral rights, but there is one subtle difference 
between Argentina’s and China’s regimes. Local provinces in Argentina 
are able to hold onto the title of land and even enter into service 
agreements with the state-run oil and gas companies. In fact, these 
agreements are typically required before a company may explore on the 
land. 
This type of hybrid approach does resolve some of the issues China 
has. Local participation is more likely to attract investment because 
investors can ensure they will not be confronted with faceless national 
bureaucrats. Additionally, local enforcement serves as an intermediary 
between the government and citizen land rights. Furthermore, local 
enforcement agencies simply know the land better and are likely to have 
“home field” advice if companies encounter drilling difficulties or are 
being careless with environmental procedures. 
These advantages do not necessarily translate if local bureaucrats 
enforce too strictly. The problem we saw with environmental enforcement 
being too strict earlier in this Note are likely to occur with property use as 
well due the overlap between land use oversight and property oversight.
150
 
Overall, foreign investors may become uncomfortable with their permits 
in the hands of local bureaucrats with little national control or room to 
negotiate with individual citizens. 
Property laws represent one part of the picture regarding mineral rights, 
however. Contract laws also have a profound effect in attracting foreign 
investors and making a shale revolution economically viable. 
VII. CONTRACT LAWS AND MINERAL LEASES 
In China, the Mineral Resources Law governs mining activities 
including investment, exploration rights, mineral rights, and leasing.
151
 
 
 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 16. The Secretariat of Energy is similar to the Department of Energy in the United 
States. It is the enforcement authority specifically for the hydrocarbon regime. Other agencies also 
take part in hydrocarbon regulation, such as the Committee for Strategic Planning and Coordination of 
the Nation Plan of Hydrocarbons Investments. Ente Nactional Regulador del Gas (ENARGAS) 
regulates the transportation and distribution of gas. Id.  
 150. See supra note 119 and accompanying text on environmental regulations. 
 151. Ella Chou, Shale Gas in China: Development and Challenges, HARVARD L. BLOG (Jul. 11, 
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However, several agencies oversee mineral contracts, but without much 
guidance or clear division of jurisdiction.
152
 Nevertheless, China does have 
a licensing scheme for mineral leasing. Generally, a company may apply 
and register for an exploration permit for a three year term from the 
Provincial Bureau of Land and Resources.
153
 When the drill is found to 
produce, the permit holder may apply for a two-year retention.
154
 
However, the holder may only reapply twice for a total of four years.
155
 
Additionally, in order to retain the permit, the holder must report 
expenditures, updates, and payments to the agency as well as the local 
county.
156
  
To some, China’s permit process with local oversight appears too 
tedious, especially for foreign investors. But this is not necessarily the 
element in Chinese contract law that deters and will continue to deter 
foreign investors interested in shale. Underneath the written law of 
contract in China is a thick layer of regulation and suspicion of foreign 
investors “based not so much on the type of contract involved, but rather 
on the citizenship of the parties to the contract.”157 This mistrust creates a 
troublesome dynamic now that foreign investors are interested in 
exploring shale in China. In fact, foreign companies may only explore 
shale through non-majority joint ventures with China’s state-run 
companies, namely, PetroChina, Sinopec, and China National Petroleum 
Corporation.
158
 With Royal Dutch Shell already pouring billions of dollars 
into exploration, it may no longer be economically feasible or efficient to 
stay in a non-majority position, especially given the strict oversight and 
control through contract law.  
In the United States, the contract laws are relaxed, with few 
government intrusions beyond blatantly unconscionable terms or unjust 
enrichment. Additionally, most companies are aware that landowners will 
 
 
2013), http://blogs.law. harvard.edu/ellachou/files/2013/07/Shale-Gas-in-China-Draft.pdf. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 6.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. See also Song Wang (宋·王安石), Woguo Tanlu Yeyan Qi Jiang (我国探路页岩气监管) 
[Our Pathfinder Shale Gas Revolution], CHINA MINING JOURNAL, Jan. 21, 2013, available at 
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/xwdt/ jrxw/201301/t20130121_1176816.htm. 
 156. See supra note 152, at 6.  
 157. Michael Burke, People’s Republic of China, 34 INT’L LAW. 883 (2000). Although this has 
changed slightly into more paternalistic measures with added oversight rather than outright mistrust, 
skepticism still exists. Id. at 883–84. 
 158. CHUNG, supra note 7; See also Chen Aizhu, Shell, Sinopec Drilling for Shale Gas in Central 
China, REUTERS, November 13, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2013/11/14/ shell-
sinopec-shale-idUSL4N0IY0VR20131114. 
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hire lawyers to read their contracts, so even the boilerplate language will 
pass constitutional muster. I will analyze two of these terms, but it is 
important to remember that there are many more terms such as spacing, 
land use, and using multiple properties for one rig.
159
 
There are two parts to a typical mineral rights lease. A primary term is 
the amount of time the lessee—the oil and gas company—can hold onto a 
lease without drilling.
160
 The oil and gas company might use this term in 
order to survey the land leased, conduct seismic tests, unitize or pool other 
properties in the area, or solicit investors for financing the drilling 
operation.
161
 In most cases, the lessee must pay a delay rental fee annually 
to keep the primary term open.
162
 Alternatively, instead of paying a delay 
rental fee, a lessor might require the lessee to “commence drilling 
operations” in order to keep the primary term lease going.163  
A secondary term follows the primary lease after the drilling crew 
begins production, and this term gives the lessee rights to keep the lease 
going for however long the well is producing and is economically 
profitable.
164
 This term can be one year, five years or indefinite—the only 
thing that matters is that the well is continuing to produce a profitable 
product. Here, it is easy to see the legal issues that may arise. First, the 
secondary term theoretically could be indefinite, but in practice, the lease 
will terminate when the well is not producing.
165
 This may sound simple, 
but sometimes, even if production has stopped, the well is still capable of 
producing, and with a shut-in royalty in a lease, the lease continues even 
without constant production. Still some leases require production “in 
 
 
 159. Pooling is a way in which oil and gas companies meet spacing requirements for drilling. 
More technically, pooling is a right to combine adjacent tracts of land in order to meet those spacing 
requirements. Voluntary pooling occurs when a landowner agrees to sign a lease which contains a 
provision on pooling or unitization. Forced pooling, in some states like Ohio, occurs where, after the 
oil and gas company has exhausted all reasonable attempts to gain a voluntary pooling agreement from 
the landowner, the company asks the state Department of Natural Resources to force the landowners 
(or owners of the mineral interests if the rights are severed) to comply with the pool. See generally 
Howard R. Williams, The Effect of Pooling and Unitization upon Oil and Gas Leases, 45(4) CAL. L. 
REV. 411 (1957), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3249& 
context=californialaw review. 
 160. Lowe, supra note 12, at 208.  
 161. Id. at 208–09. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. There is of course substantial disagreement over the definition of “commencing drilling 
operations,” but the case Breaux v. Apache Oil Corp., 240 So.2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), 
establishes fairly concretely that anything contributing to the drilling operation as a whole will be 
considered “commencing drilling operations,” even if it is simply beginning to build the site pad or 
clearing the land for the rig. Id. at 225. 
 164. Id. at 230.  
 165. Id.  
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paying quantities,” and courts look at this contract term through a two-part 
test.
166
 They first balance out revenue along with operating costs to 
determine whether producing has made a real profit.
167
 If the company has 
not made a profit, the court then assesses whether it is reasonable for the 
company to continue production while losing money. Additionally, “actual 
production” also includes a good faith effort in marketing the product and 
infrastructure considerations, such as pipelines and transport methods.
168
  
Overall, the primary and secondary terms of a lease are complementary 
because they both motivate constant economic efficiency and prevent land 
waste. The primary term encourages an oil and gas company to use the 
land leased in a reasonable amount of time rather than holding onto the 
lease and dragging the lessor along without contributing to the oil and gas 
market or using the land. The primary term limit gives the oil and gas 
company an opportunity to produce, and if that does not occur, another oil 
and gas company may move in and try to produce or the land can be used 
for other economically efficient purposes. Furthermore, the secondary 
lease encourages continuous production. Again, rather than setting up a rig 
and then not using the land to its fullest capabilities, there is a limitation. 
The freedom of contract in the United States produces the perfect balance 
between oversight and efficiency.
169
 
Contracts in Argentina pursuant to the Federal Hydrocarbon Law 
operate under a slightly different system than China. While the mineral 
rights are exclusively owned by the State, the state will make concessions 
through permits and award exclusive rights to explore and exploit the 
piece of land.
170
 During this time, which usually lasts around fifteen years, 
the permit holder takes title and receives all the royalties.
171
 However, the 
concessions in the permit contracts carry severe monetary obligations 
including production fees, windfall profits, and taxes.
172
  
 
 
 166. Id. at 230–35; See also Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.1959).  
 167. Id. at 232–35. 
 168. Id. at 237; See also Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1937).  
 169. For more examples of mineral leases, see JOHN S. LOWE, FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 145–206 (5th ed. 2004). 
 170. Law No. 17,319; See also Sections 2, 3 and 6 from Title II Federal Hydrocarbons Law.  
 171. See Law No. 2,615 of the Province of Neuquén and Decree No. 3,089 of the Province of 
Mendoza, which fix the terms and conditions; See also Jose Martinez de Hoz, Shall We Dance an 
Unconventional Tango?, PAGBAM, available at http://www.pagbam.com.ar/files/Other/Shale%2 
0we%20Dance%20an%20Uncoventional%20Tango.pdf. 
 172. Id. “The most important taxes are the following: National taxes: Income tax: 35% on the net 
taxable income. VAT: 21% applied on domestic sales of oil and gas, which is added onto the 
producer’s sales invoices and passed on to the payer. Provincial taxes: Turnover tax: 1% to 3%. For oil 
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Additionally, unlike China, Argentina does not require foreign 
investors to join a local entity or corporation in order to obtain exploration 
permits. However, they are required to establish a branch of their own 
corporation in Argentina.
173
 There is also a wide variety of types of branch 
corporations investors can choose from, such as LLCs or Incorporations
174
 
However, while it would appear foreign investors have wide latitude to 
contract, certain resolutions prohibit freedoms that are typical in the 
United States. These include not being able to contract with third parties 
for logistical, technical, or appraisal operations.
175
 Although Argentina 
does have substantially more freedom in contracting and exploration 
permits compared to China, it does not reach a point attractive to foreign 
investors. The tight constraints on contracting with third parties and the 
establishment of a branch company make the cost of drilling in Argentina 
higher and more risky than it would be in the United States. Until 
Argentina drops these restraints, it is likely a shale revolution will not 
occur.  
VIII. WHERE ARE THEY NOW? 
The United State Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) estimates 
that China has nearly 1,115 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable 
shale gas and 32 billion barrels of technically recoverable shale oil.
176
 
Argentina possesses 802 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable shale 
gas and 27 billion barrels of shale oil.
177
 The United States is far behind in 
technically recoverable shale gas, with only 665 trillion cubic feet.
178
 
Despite the numbers, the EIA and most shale data collection agencies 
point out the difference between technically recoverable shale resources 
and economically recoverable shale resources.
179
 Large companies who 
 
 
and gas it is usually 2%. Stamp tax: 1% to 2% (depending on the provincial jurisdiction).” NORTON 
ROSE FULLBRIGHT, supra note 145, at 18. 
 173. Id. at 17. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 18; See also Resolution 194/2013. 
 176. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 1. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. The United States does, however, surpass Argentina with technically recoverable shale 
oil. Id.  
 179. Id. “Technically recoverable resources represent the volumes of oil and natural gas that could 
be produced with current technology, regardless of oil and natural gas prices and production costs. 
Economically recoverable resources are resources that can be profitably produced under current 
market conditions. The economic recoverability of oil and gas resources depends on three factors: the 
costs of drilling and completing wells, the amount of oil or natural gas produced from an average well 
over its lifetime, and the prices received for oil and gas production.” Id.  
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have been trying to tap into China’s plentiful shale resources since 2009 
are considering pulling out entirely. In fact, Shell has already taken steps 
to pull out of China by canceling refinery projects partnered with 
Sinopec.
180
 
From another perspective, the Chinese government has spotted its 
domestic economic troubles and is now partnering with and investing in 
American shale projects in addition to African and Russian endeavors.
181
 
Furthermore, China’s government officials and industry analysts have 
been quoted suggesting that China itself does not believe a shale 
revolution is possible as it looks to foreign sources more and more.
182
  
Argentina does not necessarily share the same struggles with 
exploitation as China does, but the country’s seizure of their largest oil and 
gas company, YPF, shocked foreign investors, causing many to pull out or 
cancel plans to invest.
183
 This sudden nationalist behavior makes 
investment unattractive; however, Argentina has attempted to gain the 
trust of foreign investors again by relinquishing control over market 
prices.
184
 Some believe Argentina has finally begun to understand the 
 
 
 180. Ed Crooks, Shell Pulls Out of $9Bn refinery plan in China, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, 
available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e360dc0-e111-11de-af7a-00144feab49a.html; See also 
Ed Crooks, Shell Warns of Shale Delays Outside US, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/53328f06-ac1d-11e2-a063-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2s6OKC7mJ. Andrew 
Brown, head of international oil and gas production at Shell, has stated that “China was the most 
advanced of Shell’s shale projects outside North America. The rule of thumb was that it took 30 wells 
to understand a new prospect . . . In China, Shell had drilled 23 and was planning 18 more this year.” 
Id. This shows the additional effort needed for drilling in China and further questions whether it can 
mirror America’s revolution. Id. Additionally, Shell has dealt with government blockades and halting 
operations, and is spending one billion dollars every year. Spegele & Scheck, supra note 70. Enduring 
these difficulties will soon not be worth the continued investment and effort from Shell. 
 181. Collin Eaton, China’s Largest Coal Company to Learn Shale in US Deal, FUEL FIX, Jan. 3, 
2014, available at http://fuelfix.com/blog/2014/01/03/chinas-largest-coal-company-to-learn-shale-in-
u-s-deal/. “China Shenhua Energy Co., the world’s second largest coal company, is planning to create 
a joint venture between a U.S. subsidiary and a private Pennsylvania natural gas producer to drill 25 
natural gas wells in the Marcellus Shale” Id. See generally Jon Carter, China Companies Look for 
Partnerships, ENERGY AND CAPITAL, Oct. 29, 2013, available at http://www.energyandcapital.com/ 
articles/investing-in-chinese-shale-gas/3959; See also Wu Jiao, China, Russia, a Step Closer on Gas 
Supply, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 6, 2013, available at http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/bizchina/2013-
09/06/content_16948450.htm. 
 182. Chen Weidong, a senior industry analyst in close contact with the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, stated, h[t]he sector liberalisation looks unlikely to work in shale gas, as its investment is 
too high and returns are too low.” Chen Aizhu, China Back to Drawing Board as Shale Gas Fails to 
Flow, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/09/05/china-shale-
idUSL4N0GY23420130905. 
 183. The Energy Report, Argentina Tries Its Hardest to Attract Foreign Oil and Gas Companies, 
OIL PRICE, Aug. 6, 2013, available at http://oilprice.com/Finance/investing-and-trading-reports/ 
Argentina-Tries-its-Hardest-to-Attract-Foreign-Oil-and-Gas-Companies.html. 
 184. Id.  
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necessity of foreign investors in shale from Decree 929,
185
 but more 
concrete measures are yet to be seen.
186
 
The United States is still thriving in the shale revolution. The United 
States expects its 2013 oil imports to be the lowest since 1994.
187
 Also, in 
just eleven months out of 2013, net energy imports have been cut in half 
from $411 billion to $217 billion.
188
 Finally, the most evident example 
demonstrating the strength of the United States’ shale revolution is that oil 
and gas resulting from domestic shale drilling is now being exported to 
allied countries like Japan.
189
 The shale revolution has worldwide reach, 
with America at its center. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Shale will undoubtedly be on the world’s radar for decades to come; 
however, much like the reason why certain crops are grown in specific 
areas of the world and not others, shale is economical in certain parts of 
world and not others. There may be large shale formations in China and 
Argentina, larger than the United States’ reserves, but the economic 
feasibility of exploiting that shale is not worth the political and legal risks 
investors must take. Once China and Argentina realize this (and Argentina 
 
 
 185. “[President] Kirchner signed Decree No. 929/2013, which creates incentives for oil and gas 
producers that bring to Argentina hard currency equivalent to $1 billion in the first five years of a 
project. Beginning in the fifth year, the participating companies will be able to export 20 percent of 
their oil and gas production on a tax-free basis with no obligation to reimburse export proceeds to 
Argentina.” 
 Karen Boman, Argentina Oil  Gas Scheme ‘Insufficient’ to Attract Investment, RIGZONE, July 18, 
2013, available at http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/127842/Argentina_Oil_Gas_Scheme_ 
Insufficient_to_Attract_Investment#sthash.qBGJ5sBa.dpuf. 
 186. Id. In an interview with the Energy Report, Bill Newman of Mackie Research stated, 
“Argentina’s expropriation of Repsol’s share in YPF in 2012 was a bit of a shock and it forced oil and 
gas companies to step back a bit to wait and see what the government’s next move would be. But I 
think the government quickly realized that it couldn’t fund growth internally and that it needs foreign 
investment to reserve its production declines . . . The new investment incentive brought in with Decree 
929 somewhat confirms that the government understands that it needs foreign investment.” Bill 
Newman, As Argentina Backpedals, Will Oil and Gas Companies Step on the Gas?, THE ENERGY 
REPORT (Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://www.theenergyreport.com/pub/na/bill-newman-as-
argentina-backpedals-will-oil-and-gas-companies-step-on-the-gas.  
 187. John Kemp, American’s Energy Revolution Transforms International Relations, REUTERS, 
Jan. 28, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/28/energy-diplomacy-idUSL5N0L 
22YK20140128?feedType=RSS&feedName=rbssEnergyNews. 
 188. Id.  
 189. ConocoPhillips, along with other private investors, has turned a natural gas import terminal 
into an export facility. The Obama administration has “cleared the way for broader natural-gas 
exports” in light of this facility. Keith Johnson, U.S. Approves Expanded Gas Exports, WALL ST. J., 
May 18, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324767004578 
489130300876450.  
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appears to be realizing this more quickly than China), more investors will 
put time and money into exploration projects. As it stands, China and 
Argentina must change their laws to either provide more incentives to 
investors, safer means of contracting and more concrete environmental 
regulations, or they must look elsewhere to obtain oil and gas, as they have 
been doing.  
The point I argue here is not necessarily that China and Argentina 
should become mirror images of the United States. But based on my 
assessment of what laws are favorable to shale investors and what has 
allowed a shale revolution to occur in the United States, I conclude that 
China and Argentina must relax their laws and political environment in 
order to have a shale revolution of their own. China and Argentina are at a 
crossroads: without loosening authoritarian control over pricing and taking 
command of environmental regulation, they risk falling chronically behind 
in the race to energy independence. As it stands now, the United States has 
dominated that race. 
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